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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
JOE S. VALDEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
10843

Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, in December of 1966, in the Second Judicial District, Weber County, was convicted of the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon and of being an habitual
criminal. The assault conviction was appealed to and affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah on September 29,
1967. Stat.e v. Valdez, 19 (U.2d) 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967). On
January 24, 1968, a petition for a writ of coram no'bis was
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County. A hearing was held on the petition and the writ was
denied. This is an appeal from that denial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Pursuant to the appellant's petition for a writ of coram
nobis, a hearing was conducted in the District Court of Salt
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Lake County. Testimony was presented as to 'the claimed
existence of new evidence. On June 28, 1958, the petition for
the writ of coram nobis was dismissed (R.16).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the lower court's dismissal
of the appellant's petition for writ of coram nobis should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is in general agreement with the state·
ment of facts as contained in the appellant's brie'f, so far as
those portions representing the contentions of the appellant
and the victim as to what transpired are concerned, which
we·re taken directly from the transcript of the trial with an
apparent minimum of coloring. While the appellant con·
tends that no one in the bar saw the stabbing except Valerio
himself, it was claimed during 'the coram nobis hearing that
Miss Wilkerson had seen an indian make a poking motion
at Valerio and later saw him put a knife in his pocket. The
indian was apparently unavailable at both the trial and the
subsequen!t hearing. When asked why she hadn't mentioned
what she had seen during the trial, Miss Wilkerson
indicated that the indian was a friend of the appellant and
the appellant didn't want to get the indian in trouble. After
the appellant's arrest and while he was in jail awaiting trial,
the appellant claims that one Kelly Valdez, a distant cousin.
along with Miss Shirley Wilkerson, visited Valerio at his
home. Kelly Valdez contends that while at Valerio's home,
Valerio told him he "wasn't sure who stabbed him." Kelly
Valdez evidently didn't see fit to apprise the appellant of
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this information until after his trial, conviction and imprisonment. This evidence was therefore claimed to be
unknown and undiscoverable with due diligence at the time
of trial. It was only on the occasion of a happenstance visit
to the appellant by his distant cousin that the information
was disclosed for the first time. The appellant now asserts
that this same evidence given by Kelly Valdez at the coram
nobis hearing directly contradicts the testimony of Valerio
which remained unchanged at the hearing. It is argued that
this new evidence along with the belated disclosure of what
Miss Wilkerson now claims she actually saw during the
assault, requires the granting of the writ of error coram
no bis.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GR'ANT APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL ON A
WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS.
In order to substantiate the argument, the respondent
will first show what the courts require in the way of
prerequisites necessary to the issuance of a writ of coram
nobis. Next, the respondent will show how the appellant
has failed to qualify in nearly every aspects of these requirements. Lastly, the attitude that appellate courts are
required to assume in reviewing such appeals will be shown.
A.

Prerequisites necessary to issuance of writ.

Courts of law have been a'typically unanimous in establishing the following prerequisites for the issuance of a
writ of coram nobis:

(1)

Existence of material facts not presented at trial.

The leading case upon which this jurisdic'tion has relied
when determining questions as to the propriety of granting
writs of coram nobis is that of People v. Shipman, 42
Cal.Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (11965). The court in that case, whiie
discussing the requirement for newly discovered facts,
pretty much listed the entire gamut of requirements for
issuance. They said:
The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three
requirements are met. (1) Petitioner must "show
that some fact existed which without any fault or
negligence on his part was not presented to the
court at the trial on the merits and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the
judgment." (Cases cited.) . . . (2) Petitioner must
also show that the "newly discovered evidence [does
not go] to· the merits of issues tried. Issues of fact
once adjudicated even though incorrectly cannot be
reopened except on motion for new tri'al." (Cases
cited.) ... (3) Petitioner "must show that 'the facts
on which he relies were not known to him and could
not in the exercise of due diligence have 'been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier
than the time of bi's motion for the writ." (Cases
cited.) ...
It is easy to see why this case will be further cited in
subsequent portions of this argument.
In determining the degree of materiality needed in pre·
senting facts not presented at the trial, it is interesting to
note tihe case of People v. Vernon, 49 P. 326 (Cal 1935) in
which the court stated :

s
It appears to be the law that in and of itself, confession of guilt by one other than the applicant for
writ of error coram nobis, will not furnish a sufficient reason for the issuance of the writ.
While this case may appear extreme in its requirement,
courts in general are conspicuously restrictive in their determination of what constitutes "materiality". The arguments that follow will throw additional light on the
requirement that newly discovered 'facts be material.
(a) Defendant not to be at fault in non-presentation
of facts.
Not only must the newly discovered facts be material,
but the fact that they were not presented at the time of trial
must not result from any fault on the part of the defendant
or his attorney. The Shipman case, supra, has already
alluded to that requirement. This concept was earlier declared in the Utah case of State v. Woodard, 108 U. 390,
160 P.2d 432 (1945) where this court said:
For a party to be entitled to this writ, it must
appear th'at the failure to present the facts to the
court was not due to any negligence or fault of the
party seeking the writ.
Even earlier than the Shipman case, California courts
were insistent upon the defendant having "clean hands" in
connection with newly discovered evidence. In People v.
Tuthill, 198 P.2d 505, (Cal. 1948) the court held:
The office of the writ of coram nobis is to bring the
attention of the court to, and obtain relief from,
errors of fact, such as a valid defense existing in the
facts of the case, but which without negligence on
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the part of the defendant was not made, either
through duress or fraud or excusa:ble mistake. These
facts, not appearing on the face of the record, and
being such as known in season would have prevented the rendition and entry of the judgment in
question.
Colorado courts require that the defendant be blameless
in order to seek relief.
The facts relied upon must be such as do not appear
on the face of the record, failure to disclose which
was attributable to no fault of petitioner and which
would, if known, have forestalled the judgment.
Hailey v. People, 115 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1945).
Perhaps most applicable to the situation at bar is the
holding of the Indiana court which suggests that relief will
not lie where any misconduct in the presentation of the
defendant's case has been evident.
The writ of error coram nobis should not be granted
to relieve one from a predicament in which he finds
himself as the result of his own dishonest and
fraudulent conduct. Vickery v. State, 106 N.E.2d 223
(Ind. 1952).
From the foregoing it

1s

clear that every effort must

have been made to obtain all available facts and evidence
in presenting the defendant's case, and any hint of derelic·
tion of duty either on the part of the defendant or his at·
torney will be fatal in subsequent coram nobis proceedings.
(b)

Presentation of newly discovered facts would havr

prevented judgment.
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The greatest hurdle which the defendant must overcome in qualifying for the writ of coram nobis is that of pre-

senting new facts, which in the minds of the reviewing
court, would have conclusively precluded the contested
judgment from having been rendered had such evidence
been presented to the trier of facts. In the Woodard case,
supra, the court applied what might be called the coram
nobis "but for" test in saying:
The writ of corarn nobis where available seeks to
obtain a review of a judgment on the ground that
certain mistakes of fact have occurred which were
unknown to the court and to the parties affected
and that but for such mistakes the judgment would
not have been rendered.
Again, the Shipman case, su:pra, holds that such newly
discovered evidence must of necessity "have prevented
rendition of judgment."
The court in the Tuthill case, supra, similarly concluded:
. . . and where such [new facts] would have prevented rendition of the judgment questioned.
In the Hailey case, supra the Colorado court used
the phrase " ... which would if known, have forestalled the
judgment . . ." It is also interesting to note the federal
court's standard as to the necessary "weightiness" of the
new evidence. In the case of U.S. v. W.est, 170 F. Supp. 200
(N.D. Ohio 1959), a federal district court said:
The function of coram nobis is to bring to the attention of the court some fact unknown to the court
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which if known would have resulted in a different
judgment.
The Sixth Circuit expressed the following in Dunn v.
U.S., 238 F.2d 908 (6th Cir. 1956):
On application for writ of coram nobis the entire
record will be looked into by the court and the
judgment rendered which the whole requires.
The court further stated in effec't that failure of a defendant to make a showing that a retrial would have had a
different result is grounds for denial of a motion in the
nature of coram nobis to set aside his sen'tence.
The Eighth Circuit in Bateman v. U.S., 277 F.2d 65
(8th Cir. 1960) said:
A writ of error coram nobis will not lie even if the
alleged error be fundamental, unless it is probable
that a different result would have occurred had the
supposed error of fact been known to the trial court.
Thus, little question should remain in the minds of
reasonable men as to the quality and necessary effect of
newly discovered evidence required to permit the issuance
of the writ. This conclusive aspect is perhaps best summed
up in this holding of a West Virginia Federal Court:
The writ of error coram nobis does not lie for
newly discovered evidence unless the newly
discovered evidence is of such conclusive nature,
that if known would have resulted in a different
judgment. U.S. v. Ta.vlor, 49 F.Supp 353, (N.D.
West Vir 1943)
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(2)

Newly discovered facts not to go to issues already

tried.

The second requirement called for in the Shipman decision, supra, was as follows:
(2) Showing the fact does not go to merits of
issues tried.
The court clarified this concept in saying in effect that
issues of fact once adjudicated, even though incorrectly,
cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial, even
though alleged newly discovered evidence is not discovered
until af'ter time for moving for new trial has elapsed or
motion has been denied.
In the Tuthill case, supra, the unanimity of California
courts was displayed in this respect:
It is a general rule that the writ will not be granted
for newly discovered evidence going to the merits
of the issues tried. Issues of fact once adjudicated,
even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except
on motion for new trial.
It takes but little imagination to forsee the "parade of
horribles" if every issue of the case, even though material,
were open to relitigation. That ingredient of the law
"finality", which all courts seek, would be reduced to nothing more than a legal platitude.

Again, California has been a leading state in guarding
the finality of the judicial process. The California Supreme
Court declared in Ex parte Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 177 P.2d
CJ18 (1947):
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It is stated as a general rule that the writ of error
coram nobis does not lie to correct an issue of fact
which has been adjudicated even though wrongly
determined, nor for alleged false testimony at the
trial, nor on the ground that a juror swore falsely
as to his qualifications, nor for newly discovered
evidence."
In a case in which the Supreme Court of the United
States denied a writ of certiorari it was held:
Generally, a writ of coram nobis will not be granted
for newly discovered evidence going to merits of
issues tried or to correct errors of law nor is it intended to authorize any court to review and revise
its opinion. People v. Coyle, 88 Ct.App.2d 967, 200
P.2d 546 (1948).
(3) Newly discovered facts were not known to de·
fendant at the time of trial and were not discoverable in
exercise of due diligence.
As can be seen, this requirement is closely allied with
the requirement that the defendant is not at fault. In Butt v.
Graham, 6 U.Zd 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957) Justice Wade
said in effect that ''where the record disclosed that no newly
discovered evidence was produced at the hearing that could
not have been produced at the trial in a camel knowledge
prosecution, the trial court properly refused to grant coram
no bis."
Along with the court's decision in the Shipman case.

supra, the court's decision in People v. Adamson, 210 P.2d
13 (Cal. 1949) was also indicative of the consensus of opin·
ion:
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The applicant for the writ must show that the facts
upon which he relies were not known to him and
could not in the exercise of due diligence have been
discovered by him at any time substantially earlier
than the time c>f his motion for the writ. Otherwise,
he has stated no ground for relief.
In the case of People v. Campbell, 245 P.2d 311 (Cal.
1952) the court succinctly stated the doctrine as follows:

Petitioner for error coram nobis on ground of newly discovered evidence did not entitle petitioner to
relief from conviction when the alleged newly discovered evidence was either known or should have
been discovered by defendant at time of trial by
use of reasonable diligence and when there was no
allegation that petitioner had been prevented by
extrinsic causes from offering same.
Little more can be said than the requirements necessary
for the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis are narrowly
and precisely defined. Noncompliance with or nonfullfillment of the least of these requirements is deemed fatal to
an attempt at rehearing through the medium of coram nobis.
B.

Appellant failed to qualify for issuance of the writ.

The respondent will now endeavor to show that the
appellant has fallen substantially short of qualifying for the
writ.

(1) If newly discovered facts existed, they were either
immaterial or of limited import.
While it is true that the appellant's claimed new facts
or evidence were no't presented at the trial, it is apparent
that he places undue significance on them. In the first place,
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the only new "facts" presented by the appellant is the fact
that there exists a "distant" cousin who is willing to testify
he heard the victim casually mention that he was uncertain
as to who had stabbed him. The newly discovered "facts''
are neither that the victim said he wasn't sure nor that he
in fact wasn't sure. In other words, the testimony of Kelly
Va'ldez, the distant cousin, which was given at the hearing,
must, o.f necessity, be classified as pure hearsay. As such,
it can only be admitted to impeach the testimony of the
victim, and 'in no way can be used in determining the truth·
fulness of the matter asserted; i.e., that the victim, Mr.
Valerio, didn't know who stabbed him. It is necessary
before newly discovered facts can play a role in the granting
of a writ of coram nobis that those facts be "true." As the
Colorado court put it in Medberry v. People, 108 P.2d 243
(Colo. 1940), "to justify the granting of a writ of error
coram nobis, the substantive facts upon Which reliance is
placed must be true."
It is interesting to compare the claimed materiality of
the cla:imed impeachment testimony in the instant case with
the court ruled immateriality of a confession of guilt by
other than the petitioner in the Vernon case, supra. It is
difficult for the respondent to accord sufficient materiality
to belated hearsay testimony o.f a friendly distant cousin
to enti'tle appellant to a writ.
In ascertaining the truthfulness of statements alleged
to be newly discovered material evidence, the court is free
to believe or disbelieve. In the case of Pe·ople v. Bob,eda,
300 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1956) the court said:
The trial courts determination of the truth or the
veracity of a witness is final, and it is not required
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to accept as true the testimony of a witness even
though it is not contradicted.
In the same opinion the court made a statement even
more strikingly appropriate in the instant case, "It is not
a remedy available to one who has been convicted on false
testimony." Supra at P. 99

The respondent contends that the evidence claimed to
warrant the granting of a writ of coram nobis was immaterial and the court had every right, as it did, to find it so.
(a) Defendant was at fault in not presenting facts at
the trial which would have had equal or greater significance
in providing for his defense than those alleged to have been
newly discovered.
After reading the record and the appellant's brief in
this case, a number of questions remain not fully 'answered.
For instance, why did Kelly Valdez wait so long to disclose
such allegedly pertinent information to the appellant? Why
wasn't this information at least conveyed to Miss Wilkerson
who was present during the alleged utterance? What were
the real reasons for evidence of the observed "poking
motion" and knife not being disclosed at the time of trial?
Who was the indian and where did he go?
The above questions have one thing in common. They
all tend to indicate either an overly imaginative mind or a
person so unconcerned with his own defense and the outcome of his own trial that he felt little compunction to provide his attorney with pertinent available information upon
which to build a case. The informatfon, if true, concerning
the indian and his knife, might have constituted some defense and might have changed the outcome of the trial. It
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is claimed that the reasons this information was not
disclosed was that the appellant did not want to involve
his indian friend and believed s u c h evidence was not
necessary to his successful defense. The picture the appel
lant paints of himself is strikingly similar with the image
of the appellant in the case of Gross v. State, 40 N.E.Zd 333
(Ind. 1942) where the court was compelled to hold:
The writ will not is~me to one who has negligently
failed to present the facts which if known to the
judge would have prevented the judmen't. (Cases
Cited.) Much less should it be granted to a defendant who elects to perjure himself rather than
use an honest defense.
In the later companion case of Vickery v. State, 106
N.E.2d 223 (Ind. 1952) the court finished the portrait of the
appellant with these words:
The writ of coram nobis should not be granted to
relieve one from a predicament in which he finds
himself as a result of his own dishonest and fraudulent conduct.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the negligence
which an appellant displays in defeating his petition for a
writ of coram nobis need not be inexorably connected with
the nondisclosure at the trial of the later discovered facts.
If he seeks to perpetrate a fraud upon the court, whereby
material evidence remains undisclosed, he has failed to
fulfill the nonnegligence requirement.
The California Supreme Court summed up this concept
in In re De L:i Roi, 28 Cal.2d 264, 169 P.2d 363 (1946) the
cour held in essence that:
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Where a habeas corpus petitioner has trifled with
the judicial process, schemed and conspired to deceive the court and to impede or defeat justice in
relation to a major crime, and he and his witnesses
at the time of trial or on a referee's hearing of
habeas compus petition or on a subsequent application for such petition or in some or all of such proceedings, willfully presented false immaterial
testimony, the writ of coram nobis even if otherwise
proper, would be denied. (Emphasis added.)
(b)

There is no indication that the "new facts" would

have had any effect on the prior judgment, let alone that
such would have prevented the judgment.

In having thoroughly discussed the strict standard
which is universally applied to the needed effect of newly
discovered evidence, and having pointed out the questionability of the new evidence presented by the appellant as
to its competence and limited application, it is indeed difficult to imagine that a jury in hearing the "new evidence"
would he compelled to find other than it did. In translating
the accepted standard into the case at bar, the jury would
have to have found the following in order that the writ
should now issue:
Because Kelly Valdez, a distant cousin and
acquaintance of the accused, has testified that he
heard the victim, Mr. Valerio, say "I'm not sure w'ho
stabbed me," we find it impossible to find the
accused guilty of the crime as charged.
The respondent submits that once subjected to this
test, which is the most significant when weighing the propriety of issuing the writ, that the appellant's "newly
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discovered evidence" is found lacking. It cannot be can.
tended that such evidence would have precluded the judg.
ment as rendered.
(2) The issue as to who stabbed Valerio has already
been tried.
As previously mentioned, issues of fact once adjudi·
cated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened, except
on a motion for a new trial, even though alleged newly
discovered evidence is not discovered until after time for
moving for a new trial has elapsed. The trial court heard
the issues as to appellant's guilt in the trial court. The jury
decided those issues and found the appellant guilty. Those
issues of guilt were again submitted to this court in the
form of a criminal appeal. This court found sufficient
evidence in the record to confirm the jury's decision as to
those issues of guilt. A writ of coram nobis was sought with
the claim of newly discovered eviden'ce. The evidence was
heard, and yet the lower court continued to conclude, having
the entire record before it, that the issue of the appellant's
guilt had been conclusively decided. If ever an issue has
been thoroughly heard and conclusively decided, the issue
of appellant's guilt is such an issue.
(3)

New facts if in existence were discoverable before

trial and could have been known by defendant.
It is not inconceivable that had the appellant informed
his attorney of what Miss Wilkerson later stated she saw.
and if true what he personally must also have been aware
o.f, that the attorney v.rould have had adequate opportunity
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to confront the victim with this conflicting evidence and
thereby have elicited from the victim that he did not recall
for certain who had stabbed him. Not only is it possible
that the new facts could have been discovered prior to the
trial, but a reasonable probability exists that that is exactly
what would have resulted had the appellant been duly diligent in assisting counsel with his defense.
C.

Ruling of lower court will not be upset on appeal

m the absence of abuse of discretion, and petitioner has
burden of overcoming presumption in favor of validity of
conviction.
There has developed a well-founded legal tradition as
to the proper roll to be assumed by courts in reviewing
petitions for writs of error coram nobis. This roll, while
similar to that assumed in the review of all appeals, is much
more reflective of the principle that the lower court is in a
substantially better position, to correctly ascertain and decide issues of fact. Courts have expressed this concept in
varying degrees. In People v. Fowler, 346 P.2d 792 (Cal.
1959) the court said:
T'he granting of relief in pro'ceedings of this kind
rest largely within the lower court's discretion, and
its ruling thereon will not be upset on appeal except
for an abuse thereof.
It further stated :

The petitioner is deemed to be prima facie guilty.
Defendant therefore has the burden of overcoming
the presumption in favor of the validity of the
judgment by establishing through a preponderance
of strong and convincing evidence that he was de-
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prived of substantial legal rights by extrinsic
causes.
In People v. McNalley, 285 P.2d 716 (Cal. 1955) it was
somewhat earlier stated in essence:

On motion by the accused to annul, vacate and set
aside the judgment, the burden was upon him to
produce convincing proof of facts which would
constitute a legal ground for setting aside the
judgment, and on a motion by the accused to annul,
vacate and set aside the judgment against him in a
criminal case, there was a strong presumption that
judgment was valid in all respects.
With specific regard to new testimony presented by
witnesses, the partial holding of the Bobeda case, cited
earlier in this brief is reiterated.
The trial court's determination of the truth or the
veracity of a witness is final, and it is not required
to accept as true the testimony of a witness even
though not contradicted.
Nor are state courts alone in this conception of finality,
for the Sixth Circuit observed in their holding in Dunn v.
U.S., supra, that:
On application for a writ of coram nobis the entire
record will be looked into by the court and the judgment rendered which the whole requires.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that the require·
ments necessary for the issuance of the writ of error coram
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nobis are well recognized by the courts, and that when the
appellant's case is measured by those standards, it fails in
nearly all aspects to qualify for the relief sought. It is submitted that the decision of the lower court in discharging
the petition be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEAISLEY
Assistant Attorney General
JOSE:PH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
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